In 2005, the FCC expanded Lifeline: the primary telephone subsidy program, to include discounts for prepaid wireless service as well as for traditional landline service.
Introduction
Universal service has been a central goal of telecommunications policy for over 100 years. 1
Over that period, policymakers have focused on a variety of metrics for judging the "universality" of service, but the most common has been the so-called "penetration rate" of landline telephone service among American households. 2 Universal service policies have been implemented to ensure that all Americans have the opportunities and security that telephone service provides. The growth of the subsidy was significantly affected by the policy change that the FCC introduced in 2005. Initially the Lifeline subsidy was available only to subscribers of wireline services.
Due to low enrollment rates and the spread of new wireless technology, the FCC allowed companies offering prepaid wireless services the opportunity to offer Lifeline service to eligible households.
In the wake of this new policy, Lifeline subscriptions and the costs of Lifeline grew rapidly from roughly $800 million in 2008 to $1.7 billion in 2014 peaking at $2.1 billion in 2012. These ballooning costs of the subsidy provoked considerable criticism of the program, calls for program reform, and even proposed legislation to end the Lifeline program altogether or at least eliminate its wireless element. 4 The merits of this policy change, hereinafter referred to as the wireless Lifeline initiative, to 1 This effort first began through private-sector calls for "universal service" (see Parsons and Bixby (2010) ) but later became an explicit public policy objective. See 47 U.S.C. § 151, stating that "communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States, without discrimination...with adequate facilities at reasonable charges." Subsequently in Section 254 (b)(3) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the goal was made even more explicit, stating that "consumers in all regions, including low-income consumers...should have access to telecommunications and information services."
2 The Communications Act of 1996 expanded the notion of universal service to include advanced telecommunications services as they evolve. In particular, in 2005, the universal services policies were extended to include wireless service; in 2010 the FCC released the National Broadband Plan that started to shape policies toward promotion of the high-speed Internet access.
3 See FCC (2014) . 4 See, e.g., Spencer E. Ante "Millions Improperly Claimed U.S. Phone Subsidies," Washington Post, This paper has two goals. First, I seek to provide further insights into the effects of the Lifeline program on household adoption of telephone service. In particular, I focus on two aspects: the impact of the amount of the subsidy, and the impact of the recent evolution of the subsidy from being a wireline-only program to supporting both wireline and wireless services. Second, based on my estimation, I conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the subsidy. These questions are important in light of recent proposed rulemaking issued by the FCC, where the Commission proposes steps to extend the Lifeline program to broadband service. 6 To study the impact of the Lifeline subsidy, I utilize a unique database that combines both public and proprietary (location) household-level data taken from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) for the 2003-2010 period. 7 The theoretical framework is a utility-based model of consumer behavior that incorporates characteristics suggested by the data and controls for the levels of subsidy benefits and regulatory changes. These data are not ideal -there is no information on whether a household participates in the Lifeline program or not. In fact, there is no nationwide database that captures participation of households in Lifeline. To mitigate this problem, the empirical estimation is conducted under two scenarios: first, only households that are eligible for Lifeline receive the subsidy (perfect enforcement); second, the Lifeline rules are not enforced and all households receive the subsidy (inefficient enforcement). The second scenario is considered because of the evidence that a substantial number of non-eligible households received 5 See, FCC (2013) . 6 See FCC (2015) . 7 Public NHIS data are available for the later period of time, but proprietary data that I use for my estimation are available only for the 2003-2010 period. the subsidy -this phenomenon was especially aggravated after implementation of the wireless Lifeline initiative. 8 In the post-estimation, I conduct two counterfactual experiments to analyze how subscription choices of households change if the wireless Lifeline initiative is eliminated (i.e., the subsidy is not available for wireless service), and if the subsidy is eliminated altogether. Based on the results of these counterfactual experiments, I calculate the cost of adding a marginal subscriber.
In the perfect enforcement scenario, the results indicate that larger subsidies increase the propensity of households to subscribe to telephone service. Adoption of the new policy -wireless Lifeline initiative -also increased telephone penetration rates among households. However, the estimates show that adding a marginal subscriber to the telephone network is quite costly.
Given that the Lifeline benefit payments in 2010 amounted to approximately $1.2 billion, the estimated cost of adding a marginal wireline or wireless subscriber is $1,151 per year. Given that the actual cost of the subsidy is only $138 per year, the estimates indicate that only one of eight households enrolled in Lifeline subscribes to telephone service because of the subsidy; the other seven are infra-marginal subscribers (i.e., households that would subscribe to telephone service even in the absence of the subsidy). Based on the results of a counterfactual experiment specific to the wireless Lifeline initiative, the estimated cost of adding a marginal subscriber to a wireless network is $2,835 per year. That means that only one out of twenty households that receive subsidies for wireless prepaid service subscribes to telephone service because of the subsidy; the other nineteen are infra-marginal subscribers. I also find that if the Lifeline program were eliminated altogether, over one million households would have cancelled telephone service in 2010, which would have decreased the telephone penetration rate among US households from 95.8 percent to 94.9 percent.
In the inefficient enforcement scenario, the level of the Lifeline benefit and the extension of the subsidy to wireless service also increase the propensity of households to subscribe to telephone service. However these effects, while significant, are much smaller than in the first scenario. Thus, the estimated cost of adding a marginal subscriber to the telephone network, wireline or wireless, is higher than in the first scenario -approximately $3,093 per year, while the cost of adding a marginal subscriber to a wireless network is $5,486 per year. In this scenario the consumer behavior is quite different than in the perfect enforcement case. The results from the counterfactual experiment indicate that if the subsidy were cancelled for both wireline and wireless services, the majority of consumers would switch from the "wireless-only" category to either "both" or "landline-only" categories. Only about 400,000 households would have disconnected telephone service in 2010, which would have decreased the overall telephone subscription rates from 95.8 percent to 95.5 percent.
This study complements the literature in several ways. First, I estimate my model in the framework where consumers have a choice of wireless, wireline or both services, 9 while existing empirical studies of the Lifeline program focus primarily on traditional landline service [Garbacz and Thompson(1997 , Eriksson, Kaserman and Mayo (1998) , and Ackerberg et al. (2014) ]. Second, I analyze how the extension of Lifeline to include wireless service affected a household's propensity to adopt a phone. To my knowledge, there has been no empirical study of this regulatory change. Finally, I provide a cost-benefit analysis of the subsidy as a whole and of its wireless element.
My results are similar to the existing findings. Most of the economic research on the Lifeline program has indicated that it has promoted telephone subscriptions, but the gains have been costly.
Erickson, Kaserman and Mayo (1998) estimate that the cost per new subscriber was between $133 and $556 depending on the poverty level for the 1985-1993 period. Garbacz and Thompson (2002) show that the cost per added household was $191 in 1990, and it increased to $1581 in 1998. The most recent study by Ackerberg et al. (2013) estimates that the cost of adding a new subscriber was $519 in 2000.
The next section provides background of the Lifeline program.
Evolution of the Lifeline Program
The Lifeline program was established in 1984 after the divestiture of AT&T in response to the concerns that potential rate increases could harm low-income consumers and decrease their 9 This paper builds on the literature that studies telecommunications demand, e.g., Perl (1983) , Taylor and Kridel (1990) , Bell Canada (Bodnar et al. 1988 ), Train, McFadden and Ben-Akiva (1987 ), Taylor (1994 , Schement (1995) , Riordan (2002) , Rodini, Ward and Woroch (2003) , Gideon and Gabel (2011), and Macher et al. (2015) . telephone subscription rates. 10 Initially Lifeline was available to low-income subscribers of wireline service, the only telephone option widely available to the public at the time.
The Lifeline program promotes telephone subscribership by providing low-income households with monthly discounts on the cost of telephone service. To qualify for Lifeline, the household income must be at or below 135 percent of the Federal Poverty Guidelines, or one of the household members must participate in one of the welfare programs specified by the FCC. 11 Each eligible household can subsidize at most one phone, regardless of the number of telephone subscriptions in a household. Currently, the level of Lifeline benefits is standardized in all states at $9.25 per month. Before 2012, the subsidy amount varied across states. My estimation strategy leverages this variation to evaluate the importance of the size of the benefit. Historically, the program was not very popular among eligible households. Up is a one time subsidy that reduces the initial subscription fee for the public switched network or the activation fee for wireless service. Link Up has been a much smaller program than Lifeline, it accounted for less than 10 percent of total low-income subsidy payments. It was eliminated except for recipients on Tribal lands in February 2012 as a result of FCC reforms (see FCC (2012)) and it is not addressed in the current study. 12 The statistics are provided for 2010, because the sample used in the empirical estimation is for the 2003-2010 period.
13 Studies by Burton, Macher and Mayo (2007) and Hauge, Jamison and Jewell (2008) In fact, facilities-based carriers had provided Lifeline support for wireless service before 2008; however, the Lifeline wireless payments were negligible. The elimination of the "facilities requirement" opened a way for many resellers that previously had not qualified as ETCs, to apply for provision of Lifeline support -by 2014 prepaid wireless carriers were offering Lifeline subsidy in 49 states. For this reason, the wireless Lifeline initiative is often considered the beginning of subsidized wireless phones, popularly called "Obama phones." 17 of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 96-45, FCC 00-208, 15 FCC Rcd 12,208 (2000) .
15 See Lifeline and Link Up, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 FCC Rcd 8302 (2004) . 16 The grant of the ETC status was conditional on TracFone (a) providing its Lifeline customers with 911 and enhanced 911 (E911) access regardless of activation status and availability of prepaid minutes; (b) providing its Lifeline customers with E911-compliant handsets and replacing, at no additional charge to the customer, non-compliant handsets of existing customers who obtain Lifeline-supported service; (c) complying with conditions (a) and (b) as of the date it provides it provides Lifeline service; (d) obtaining a certification from each Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) where TracFone provides Lifeline service confirming that TracFone complies with condition (a); (e) requiring its customers to self-certify at time of service activation and annually thereafter that they are the head of household and receive Lifeline-supported service only from TracFone; and (f) establishing safeguards to prevent its customers from receiving multiple TracFone Lifeline subsidies at the same address.
17 This moniker is however inapt. The change in the regulation was approved in 2005, during the Bush Administration.
Since implementation of the wireless Lifeline initiative, the number of Lifeline participants has grown significantly. The extension of the subsidy to prepaid wireless service may have benefited low-income consumers, the majority of whom have been relying solely on wireless service in the recent years. 18 Figure 6 shows subscription rates to telephone service among low-income and all US households over the 1984-2014 period. The telephone subscription rates among low-income households have increased from 89.7 percent in 2008 to 93.1 percent in 2014. Also, the difference in subscription 18 Blumberg, Stephen J., and Julian V. Luke (2015) .
rates between low-income and all US households has significantly narrowed over time.
Alternatively, even though the growth of the Lifeline program coincided with the growth of telephone subscriptions (this tendency is shown in Figure 3 ), there might be other factors that prompted households to subscribe to telephone service such as improved quality of wireless service or a decrease in prices of telephone service. Potentially, the growth of Lifeline may have been caused by the worsened economic conditions and decreases in income. Note that concurrent with the effective implementation of the wireless Lifeline initiative in 2008, the US entered a period of significant financial turmoil and recession. During this time other social welfare programs also experienced significant increases in program participantion and in program costs.
Besides worsened economic conditions, there are several other possible causes of growth of the Lifeline program related to the introduction of wireless Lifeline initiative that would not necessarily result in increased subscription rates. First, the wireless Lifeline initiative might have attracted eligible customers who had not been enrolled in Lifeline before the subsidy expansion. These could be either customers who had not subscribed to telephone service before Lifeline expansion (marginal consumers), in which case subscription rates would increase, or customers who would have subscribed to telephone service anyway but who now find it more attractive to take Lifeline (infra-marginal subscribers), in which case subscription rates would stay the same.
A second source of change that might be caused by the wireless Lifeline initiative is that the filter by which households are deemed to be eligible became less binding. The program enrollment process, initially designed for traditional wireline service, was not adjusted for extension to wireless service which is quite different in nature. This led to fraud and waste of federal funds. 19 In particular, the rule of one phone service per household became harder to sustain once the subsidy was available to cell phone service subscribers in the absence of a unified database of all Lifeline customers. 
Data Overview and Descriptive Statistics
The initial NHIS data set contains 190,072 household-level observations. I eliminate observations for which essential information is missing. The sample used in the estimation contains 20 For example, the number of Lifeline subscribers in Louisiana, which does not require documentation of program participation at enrollment, increased by 1,565 percent from 2008 to 2011. Over the same period, the number of Lifeline subscribers in Kansas, which does require documentation, increased only by 105 percent from 2008 to 2011 (See FCC (2012) ). Based on the ETCs' surveys conducted in 2011, 9 percent of the respondents surveyed responded that they were no longer eligible for Lifeline, and 27 percent of subscribers failed to respond to the carriers' verification surveys. 21 For further details, see http : //www.cdc.gov/nchs/nhis/about nhis.htm. households were wireless-only, and more than 62 percent of low-income households subscribed only to cell phone service. In contrast, the US average was around 47 percent in 2014. Table 4 provides summary statistics based on the sample used in the estimation.
Variables
To determine the main factors that influence demand for telephone service, and in particular the effect of subsidies and regulation, I employ several groups of explanatory variables. Finally, from the NHIS data, I identify households eligible for low-income benefits according to the federal eligibility criteria (Eligible Household ). For robustness check, I used other controls for the wireless Lifeline initiative, such as an indicator that subsidies for wireless prepaid service are offered in a particular state, and wireless Lifeline prepaid payments per capita. The regression results with either of these measures are very similar to the ones with the total prepaid wireless payments.
Price and Income Variables
24 These data were graciously provided by Greg Rosston, Scott Savage and Bradley Wimmer. See Rosston, Savage and Wimmer (2008) for their research using these data. While many local telephone companies offer local measured service in which customers pay a smaller monthly subscription charge and (after a call or minute allowance) pay a marginal charge per minute or call, industry sources report that the percentage of customers who avail themselves of this option is de minimus. Accordingly, I focus on consumers' choices based on variations in flat monthly rates. For a detailed study of the economics of such optional calling plans, see Miravete (2002) . 1998 (i.e. 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010) . 25 COST reports the prevailing state sales tax inclusive of general sales taxes. Local tax rates for each state were calculated as the average of those imposed in the largest city and those imposed in the capital city.
The first two reports include the single measure of local and state taxes applied to wireline local and long distance service as well as mobile service. In later reports, taxes levied specifically on wireless service were reported separately. I used linear interpolation to calculate tax rates for the years between reports.
Drawing on the NHIS survey data, I also include measures of household income. Household income is categorized relative to an annual poverty threshold using four dichotomous variables.
Household income below the poverty threshold (Income1 ), between one and two times the poverty 25 See COST (2002, 2005) and Mackey (2008 Mackey ( , 2011 threshold (Income2 ), between two and four times the poverty threshold (Income3 ), and more than four times the poverty threshold (Income4 ) are relevant categories. The endogeneity concern regarding the amount of the Lifeline subsidy arises from the presumption that states with lower telephone subscription rates might provide higher low-income support in order to increase penetration rates. This assumption is supported by the statistics from the FCC Monitoring Report, 2010. Table 3 shows that in 1997 the penetration rates among low-income households in the states with high assistance is lower than in the states with intermediate or low assistance. The same holds for the sample of all households; however, the difference in penetration rates among states with different levels of assistance is smaller. By 2009, the difference in telephone subscription rates diminished for states with different support levels.
Endogenous Variables and Exclusion Restrictions
As always with endogeneity, the selection of exclusion restrictions is an issue. Exclusion restrictions should be correlated with the endogenous variables, but should not affect the dependent variable. The exclusion restriction I use in the equation (2) for estimation of the wireline price is the Hausman-Type Instrument. 26 The price instrument for county i is calculated as the average price in other counties in the same state. This instrument seems to be appropriate, because carriers face the same regulations and fees within the same state, so the prices of the same carrier in other counties should reflect common costs within the state.
To estimate the wireless price, I use Mobile Penetration. It is plausible that economies of scale exist in the wireless industry. Economies of scale imply cost reductions with increased penetration.
Thus, mobile penetration might impact the price as a cost-shifter. Regression analysis shows that the mobile penetration rate does not influence telecommunications demand. 27 Hence, it seems to 26 See Hausman (1996) , Petrin and Train (2010) . 27 See Barnett and Kaserman (1998) .
be a reasonable choice of instrument.
I use the percent of families at or below 135 percent of the poverty level (Families Below 135 ) as the exclusion restriction for the subsidy payments. This variable does not directly affect the telecommunications demand, but states with higher poverty levels may be more prone to provide higher social benefits. To check for robustness, I also use the party affiliation of the governor (Democrat Governor ) as an exclusion restriction for the amount of the subsidy. In the majority of the states, a public utility commissioner is appointed by the governor. The Public Utility Commission plays a major role in determining the size of the Lifeline subsidy. Democrats might be inclined to provide more generous subsidies than Republicans. (2015) . 29 The annual data are available in the CTIA report. It includes repeaters and other cell-extending devices but excludes microwave hops. The location of the specific cell site is confidential, thus I am unable to account for their geographic distribution. My measure of cell sites might also underestimate inter-temporal wireless service quality improvement due to technological differences of towers deployed in the different periods.
Demographic Variables

Econometric Specification
For empirical estimation I utilize a mixed logit model. This model allows to account for heterogeneity in consumers' preferences, does not restrict substitution patterns, and allows for correlation in unobserved factors over time. The price coefficient varies across consumers, while other coefficients are fixed. The price coefficient is independently normally distributed. I also account for potential endogeneity of the prices and levels of subsidy benefits.
Consider a consumer who faces four alternatives for a telephone: (1) no phone, (2) landline only, (3) cell phone only, or (4) both landline and cell phone, and chooses the alternative with the highest level of utility. The utility of option j (j = 0, N, W, N W ), which accordingly corresponds to the choice of no phone (0), wireline only (N), wireless only (W), or both phones (NW) can be written as:
where P rice njt is the price of service j (j = N, W, N W ) faced by household n at time t, and price of outside option (no phone) is zero; LL nt denotes the amount of Lifeline benefits that household n faces at time t; W LI njt represents the wireless Lifeline initiative (it is approximated by the total amount of subsidy payments to wireless prepaid ETCs in the state of household n's residence at time t); X nt is a k × 1 vector that includes all other controls, such as income and demographic characteristics of household n at time t and some alternative-specific characteristics in the area where household n resides; β n is a random price coefficient that represents taste of consumer n;
njt is the unobserved portion of utility.
To address the issue of potential endogeneity of prices and low-income benefits, I follow Petrin and Train (2010) by implementing a control function approach. The idea behind the control function approach is to derive proxy variables that condition on the parts of endogenous variables that are correlated with the unobserved utility njt . This can be done, if endogenous variables are regressed on all the exogenous variables that enter utility and some exclusion restrictions Z n that do not directly enter utility, but impact endogenous variables. In the first stage I estimate the following system of equations:
System of equations (2) is estimated by simple OLS regression of prices and subsidy benefits on exogenous variables X nt and exclusion restrictions Z nt . Then I recover the estimated residuals to use them as control functions in the estimation of mixed logit:
where CF (v njt , ν nt ; λ P , λ B ) denotes the control function with corresponding parameters λ P and λ B .
I specify the control function as linear in v njt and ν nt ;˜ njt are i.i.d. extreme value and independent of other regressors.
The utility function with the control function that generates the mixed logit model is specified as:
where η nj is i.i.d. standard normal, and σ is standard deviation of η nj .
Conditional on the CF, the probability that consumer n chooses alternative i is equal to
where 1 is an indicator function.
Given that the error terms follow extreme value distribution, the mixed logit probability based on this utility is specified as:
In the framework of perfect enforcement, the subsidy levels as well as the expansion of Lifeline are relevant only to eligible households. To account for that, the amounts of the Lifeline benefits, and control for the wireless Lifeline initiative enter utility function intersected with the dummy variable indicating that a household is eligible to enroll in the program. In the framework of ineffective enforcement, I assume that any household is a potential beneficiary of Lifeline. In this case, subsidy levels and Lifeline expansion are relevant for every household and these variables enter utility without any intersection. 30
Results
First, consider mixed logit model in a perfect enforcement framework, where it is assumed that only eligible households are able to enroll in the subsidy program. In each regression the unit of observation is a household and the dependent variable is telephone choice of the household.
The independent variable of interest is the amount of subsidy benefits (Lifeline Benefit), and the total amount of Lifeline payments for wireless prepaid service in a state (Lifeline Wireless Initiative). All subsidy-related variables enter the model interacted with an indicator of eligible household (Eligible Household ).
Other independent variables are the prices of all telephone options (wireline, wireless, or both services); the price of the outside option (no phone) is zero. This approach is used in the majority of existing studies of Lifeline (see, Garbacz and Thompson (1997 , 2003 ), except for the study by Ackerberg et al. (2014) who conduct analysis on the sample of lowincome households.
31 See Macher et al., (2015) .
of wireless service, and year dummies to account for time fixed effects and the potential impact of recession. Following the methodology of control function approach, I include estimated residuals from the equation (2). Table 5 reports the estimation results for this model. The reference category is the outside option (no phone). The retained price residuals from the first step are not significant indicating that the hypothesis of price exogeneity cannot be rejected. The retained residual of Lifeline Benefit is negative and significant, which means that the hypothesis of the endogeneity of amount of subsidy cannot be rejected.
Determinants of Telephone Subscription
The estimates confirm findings in the existing literature; the major drivers of telephone demand are found to be price, income, age, home ownership, and quality of mobile service. 32 Lower prices increase the propensity of households to adopt a phone. The results, not surprisingly, indicate that the most price-sensitive groups of consumers are households below the poverty level, and with the ratio of income to the poverty level between one and two. The price-sensitivity does not vary significantly among consumers in the two highest income categories.
Wealthier and elderly households have a higher propensity to subscribe to the telephone network. Wealthier households tend to subscribe to both services, and are less likely to be wireless-only.
The greater age of the head of the households and home ownership are both associated with an increased propensity of subscription to wireline service only, or to both wireline and wireless services, and a decreased propensity of subscription to wireless service only.
The results also indicate that improved quality of wireless service, measured by the number of cell sites, considerably increases the propensity of households to subscribe to wireless service only, and decreases the propensity of households to subscribe to only a landline.
Effects of Lifeline. Perfect Enforcement Turning to the principal variables of interest,
the results reveal that higher levels of Lifeline benefits increase the likelihood of subscription to telephone services among eligible households. The results also indicate that the FCC's wireless Lifeline initiative has had a positive and significant impact on the propensity to subscribe to landline only and to wireless only services. As expected the implementation of subsidies for wireless 32 See, for example, Riordan (2002) , Macher et al. (2012) .
prepaid service increases the propensity to subscribe to wireless service. It is quite surprising that the wireless Lifeline initiative increases the household propensity to subscribe to landline service.
A possible explanation is that the extension of Lifeline made the subsidy program more popular among eligible households, perhaps due to advertising. More eligible households started enrolling not only in wireless Lifeline, but also in Lifeline for wireline service.
To summarize, the results indicate that the subsidy, in fact, has increased telephone penetration rates among eligible households, and the subsidization of prepaid wireless service has encouraged even more low-income households to subscribe to telephone network.
To test the goodness of fit of the mixed logit model, I estimate the predicted frequencies of alternatives. Table 6 shows that the estimated probabilities closely match the shares of customers choosing each alternative.
Counterfactual Policy Experiment. Perfect Enforcement Using the estimates from the mixed logit model reported in Table 5 , I conducted a policy experiment to see how elimination of Lifeline altogether, or its prepaid wireless part, would impact penetration rates and telephone choices of households in general. Table 7 provides the results of this exercise. The estimates show that if the prepaid mobile service were not subsidized, households would switch from being wireless only to "both" and "landline only" categories. Households would switch to the "both" category, because the two services are substitutes; hence, a household can partly substitute the more expensive wireless service for the less expensive landline service, and still enjoy the convenience of wireless service (mobility). In addition, 147,034 households give up the telephone service altogether.
If the program were to be eliminated entirely, then over one million households would cancel telephone services (that is a 23.6 percent in the number of households that currently do not have telephone service); 60 percent of disconnected households are coming from the "wireless only"
category, 30 percent from the "landline only" category, and 10 percent from the "both" category. Similarly, I calculate the cost of adding a marginal subscriber to the wireless network. I find that the wireless Lifeline initiative has attracted new subscribers at an even higher expense of $2,835 per additional subscriber per year. That means that only one out of twenty households is a marginal subscriber; and the remaining nineteen are infra-marginal subscribers.
Inefficient Enforcement of Eligibility
The FCC reported cases when non-eligible consumers enrolled in the low-income support programs due to self-certification of eligibility. 33 With this evidence, I consider a scenario with ineffective enforcement of subsidy rules, that is when noneligible households are also able to receive the subsidy.
To estimate a mixed logit model in this setting, I include controls from the previous model, except now the program benefits and control for the wireless Lifeline initiative enter the model without interaction with eligibility. Table 8 reports estimation results for this model. The results closely mimic estimates under the perfect enforcement scenario. The level of the Lifeline subsidy has a positive and statistically significant impact on the propensity of households to adopt a phone. The introduction of subsidies for prepaid wireless service also enhances the subscription to all three telephone options. However, both coefficients are smaller than in the case of perfect enforcement of Lifeline rules. Table 9 presents the goodness of fit test for this mixed logit model. The predicted frequencies of alternatives closely match the actual shares of consumers choosing each alternative.
Counterfactual Policy Experiment. Inefficient Enforcement Table 10 The bottom line is, if non-eligible consumers are also able to receive a subsidy for telephone service, the penetration rates would slightly increase, but to a greater extent it would influence the telephone choices of households, not the subscription decision. Under this scenario, the overall cost of adding a marginal subscriber to telephone network (wireline or wireless) in 2010 is $3,093 per year, while the cost of adding a marginal subscriber to the wireless network is $5,486 per year.
Conclusion
An extensive body of literature has evaluated universal service and the policies implemented to achieve ubiquity of access to the historical wireline network. Over the years, the Lifeline program has undergone significant changes that include changes in benefit levels, eligibility criteria, and services supported by this program. The existing literature does not provide sufficient research on universal service policies as they have evolved. This paper seeks to fill that gap and investigates if the low-income program has acted to promote connectivity of American households and at what cost.
The results reveal that when the rules of the program are strictly enforced and only eligible households are able to enroll in Lifeline, higher amounts of the subsidy increase the propensity of households to subscribe to telephone service. The policy experiment based on the estimates from the mixed logit model showed that if the wireless prepaid part of Lifeline were to be eliminated, 147,034 households would cancel telephone services. If the Lifeline program were to be terminated altogether, then over one million households would give up telephone services, which would have increased the rate of households without telephone service from 3.9 percent to 4.8 percent in 2010.
The overall estimated cost of adding a new subscriber to the telephone network in 2010 is $1,151 per year; while the cost of adding a new subscriber under the prepaid wireless part of Lifeline is much higher: $2,835 per year.
Under the assumption that any household is able to enroll in the subsidy program, the results indicate that the higher Lifeline benefits encourage subscription to the telephone network.
Introduction of subsidies to prepaid wireless service also has a positive impact on the likelihood of subscription to all three telephone options. However, in this setting, the subsidy to a greater extent influences the choice of telephone options, not the subscription decision. In this setting the estimated cost of adding a marginal subscriber to the telephone network in 2010 is $3,093 per year, while the cost of adding a marginal subscriber under the wireless Lifeline initiative is $5,486 per year.
The lesson here is that prior to the extension of the subsidy to additional services, the policymakers should thoroughly consider the changes in the program that need to take place in order to make the program efficient in fulfilling its purpose (help marginal consumers to subscribe to telephone network). Also, given how many infra-marginal subscribers currently receive the subsidy, more research is needed to identify the eligibility filters that would efficiently target consumers that need subsidy assistance. Taxation (COST), years 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010 .
APPENDIX A COMPARISON OF NHIS AND THE US CENSUS BUREAU DEMOGRAPHICS
Income1
This variable is dichotomous, taking on a value of 1 if the surveyed household has family income below poverty threshold.
Income2
This variable is dichotomous, taking on a value of 1 if the surveyed household has ratio of family income to poverty threshold between 1 and 2.
Income3
This variable is dichotomous, taking on a value of 1 if the surveyed household has ratio of family income to poverty threshold between 2 and 4.
Income4
This variable is dichotomous, taking on a value of 1 if the surveyed household has ratio of family income to poverty threshold above 4. Source: National Health Interview Survey, annual, 2003 Survey, annual, --2010 
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